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15. The National Minimum Wage :Pride or
Prejudice?
Timothy Whitton
Background
It was not until the 1987 election campaign that the TUC and the Labour Party clearly came
out in favour of introducing a national minimum wage in Great Britain.  The unions have
traditionally  been  opposed  to  this  type  of  legislation  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  First  and
foremost they believe that voluntarism is far more desirable than state intervention and that
above all, collective bargaining would in the long run be the most efficient way of putting an
end to poverty wages.
Coming to terms with the fact that union organisation has failed and has not been able to
extend out to embrace those sectors affected by poverty wages has most certainly been a
difficult bullet to bite. But the unions have eaten humble pie and come round to the idea that
poverty wages can only be abolished through across-the-board minimum wage legislation.
As can only be expected, the unions have endeavoured to capitalize on their minimum wage
policy  ‘u’  turn.  To  this  end  their  recent  campaign  for  the  national  minimum  has  been
high-profile,  a  far  cry from the  traditional  motions  voted  at  every annual  congress  when
members implored the unions to do their utmost in order for wage protection to reach the four
corners of industry.
Added to this is the effect of the Wages Councils which, until abolition in 1993, were in a
position to protect the most vulnerable flanks of industry from low wages. However much
actual Wages Council minimum wage-fixing machinery can be criticized, their job was to
establish minimum wages for workers who, because of labour market conditions, were prone
to  the  harshness  of  low wages.  Designed as  substitutes  to  free  collective  bargaining,  the
Wages Councils have always been a grumbling appendix to the trade union movement for
they existed as the everyday proof that  worker organisation was just not  in  a position to
eradicate pittance wages. Their disappearance has not only meant that Britain is now the only
country in Europe with no form of minimum wage protection, but also, as we shall see later,
has resulted in further wage depression in former Wages Council industries.
This tallies perfectly with the Conservatives' devotion to the free market. In the name of job
flexibility,  competition  and  the  usual  litany  of  free-market  principles  that  underpin
‘Thatcherite’ ideology, the Conservatives have gradually eroded legislation that hinders the
basic  rules  of  supply  and demand  on the  labour  - and therefore  wage  - market.  Instead,
wage(income)-supplementing  was  introduced  in  1971  with  Family  Income  Supplement
(renamed Family Credit in 1988) whereby workers earning less than a certain rate could ask
for  their  income  to  be  ‘topped  up’.'  And  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  1974-79  Labour
government did not abolish this legislation hoping possibly  that the Social Contract would
render wage supplementing redundant.
This  leaves  the  Labour  Party to  somehow wriggle  round all  these obstacles  in  order  to
present its own case. Having committed itself, it is now being politely asked to go the whole
hog and state a specific level for the national minimum wage. With the election won and
industry's resistance to a minimum wage unabated, New Labour knows that the subject is best
avoided  and  hence  Blair's  pledge  to  establish  a  Low  Pay  Commission.  This  is  a  neat
compromise  because  by  relying  on  a  commission  to  establish  and  monitor  the  promised
minimum wage, Labour has substantially reduced the potential the minimum wage question
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has to create difficulties now it is in office. Should it take the plunge and commit itself to one
particular minimum wage then calculating the economic cost of such a decision is a simple
question of classroom mathematics. In this respect, their approach was far more electorally
friendly than any statement on an hourly or weekly rate could have been.
Various groups  - Low Pay Unit,  Child Poverty Action Group, etc  - have for years been
campaigning either against low wages, for a national minimum wage or both. They are far
more concerned with the effect a national  minimum wage would have on reducing social
disadvantage and poverty - especially household poverty in the Child Poverty Action Group's
case - to the extent that in many cases it becomes difficult to see the wood for the trees. In
their hands, the minimum wage becomes far too often a magic wand capable with one touch
of getting rid of either inequality or poverty due to low pay. Even though poverty stemming
from low pay often makes up the plight of numerous households struggling to make ends
meet, the link between the two is not that straightforward. Indeed a majority of people having
to cope with poverty are deprived of any work whatsoever and a national minimum would
therefore  have  very  little  direct  impact  on  them.  Income  and  wages  are  far  too  often
considered to be one and the same thing and even if it is true that in practise this is often the
case, legislation deals with them quite separately. Interaction between the two is nonetheless
paramount in deciding on redistributive policies designed to reduce inequalities.
In  the  run-up to  the  1997 General  Elections,  the  Catholic  Church also  threw its  moral
authority  behind  a  minimum  wage  in  a  pamphlet  entitled  The  Common  Good  and  the
Catholic  Church's Social Teaching2,  in which Cardinal  Basil  Hume strongly criticised the
‘abuse of economic power’ which according to the church, deprives employees of a decent
wage and damages social cohesion.
Disemployment effects
One of the main arguments against the introduction of a minimum wage is the disemployment
effects that it would generate. In the eyes of the freemarketeers, wages should depend solely
on what the employee is worth to the employer. In this way wages will automatically and
‘naturally’  reach  their  market-clearing  level  thus  rendering  any  outside  intervention
superfluous.3
In an ideal labour-market where unemployment is reduced to a strict minimum and is purely
frictional,  this  argument  holds  some  water  because  the  labour  force  is  in  a  position  to
negotiate the conditions it thinks fit for a particular industry. Obviously the more clout the
worker  organisation  has  in  the  form  of  a  union  for  example,  the  better  the  conditions
negotiated will be. Other factors have to be taken into account, such as the distribution of
competition on the labour market, but generally conditions tend to be satisfactory. The present
day ‘real’ labour market offers quite a different picture. Unemployment has in recent years
remained at overall high levels meaning that not only is labour market competition extremely
fierce but also many workers have been marginalized from mainstream union organisation.
In times of high unemployment minimum wage legislation can be considered as a luxury
because  government's  main  concern  is  job  creation,  but  at  what  cost?4 Eliminating  all
obstacles including minimum wage legislation is one way of encouraging employment but the
price to pay is an even more extensive distribution of wages. The margins of this include on
the one hand a low-wage, poorly trained, inadequately organised workforce which in the long
run could lead to such social disadvantage that the ultimate bill will be more expensive, and
on the other  hand,  fabulous  salaries  paid to  top executives.  Comparing  the two certainly
provides  material  for  newspaper  headlines  which  are  only  too  eager  to  underline  the
inequality of wage distribution but shed little light on the impact a national minimum wage
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would have on British industry. Whereas the minimum wage can go a long way in eradicating
poverty wages, the impact it would have on wages at the top of the spectrum is only minimal.
As far as the labour market is concerned, there is little evidence to suggest that a national
minimum wage fixed at a reasonable rate would have the disemployment effects feared by so
many. To illustrate this the following table shows some of the different rates suggested: 
Table 15.1 Definitions of low pay 1997
£/wk £/hr
Council of Europe's decency threshold
(68%  full  time  average  earnings  - men  and
women
239.16 6.31
Low Pay Unit's pay threshold
(66% median male earnings)
223.27 5.89
Half median male earnings 167.45 4.42
[Low  Pay  Unit  calculations  based  on  1996  New  Earnings  Survey.  Average  weekly  pay
£351.70. Median weekly pay £334.90. Average hours per week 40.2. Average weekly hours
excluding overtime 37.9]
Source: The New Review of the Low Pay Unit, N.43, Jan/Feb 1997, Unison: London.
The TUC's official figure is not clear for although £4.26/hr seemed to be the target for the
1996  Congress;  “Opposition  to  a  national  minimum  wage  intensified  yesterday  after  it
became clear that some of the most powerful unions will be upping their demands from £4.26
an  hour  to  £4.41.”  (The  Guardian,  27  September  1996).  This  came  in  the  wake  of  an
embarrassing misunderstanding between the TUC and Labour, the latter preferring to leave
the precise rate at which the minimum wage should be set until after the election.5
The idea of a reasonable rate is important here because what is striking about the minimum
wage debate is the fact that one major question remains hanging namely, who exactly is the
minimum wage supposed to  protect?  In other  words,  the  precise  nature  of  ‘disadvantage
generated by low wages’ has never been fully addressed, leading to the wrong questions being
answered in a variety of ways. To illustrate this let us look more closely at the sort of workers
who the above minimum wage targets would affect the most. The following table sets out the
figures for a few selected industries.
Table 15.2 Some employment sectors with high incidences
 of low earnings. Full time manual workers; men and women
Sector % Women % Men
Earnings Below: Earnings below:
350p 400p 460p 350p 400p 460p
Agriculture: growing of crops, 
Market gardening, horticulture
23.2 52.2 72.5 17 38.9
Manufacture of textiles 21.9 43.8 64.9 11.9 24.2
Manufacture of wearing apparel;
Dressing and dyeing of fur
31.7 52.8 72.4 30.3 42.2
Manufacture of footwear 14.8 36.1 54.1 6.8 17
Wholesale of food, beverages 
and tobacco
33.8 50.7 63.4 17.4 32.3
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Retail* 21.7 41.7 68.5 18.2 34.9
Hotels 45.6 72.5 80.2 45 60
Restaurants 49 73.1 88.3 53.9 69.4
Bars 60.4 78.2 81.8 50 68.9
Canteens and catering 17.4 43.5 73.9 16.7 28.1
Education : secondary 27 50 67 8.6 31.6
                  Higher 14.3 34.9 61.9 14 28
Other service activities 48.7 70.9 84.1 36.6 51.2
All industries and services 22.5 39 57.7 10.4 20.1
* Retail trade except for motor vehicles and motorcycles, repair of personal and household
goods.
Gross hourly earnings pay-period not affected by absence.
Source: New Earnings Survey 1995. HMSO, tables 70 and 72
If we apply the suggested national minimum wage rates to this table it is clear that the lower
figure of £4.26 would have a considerable effect on full time women manual workers and
some impact on their male counterparts.6 The upper figures suggested by the Low Pay Unit
and the European Council would affect a majority of workers both male and female in these
particular industries and indeed in other ‘better paid’ ones. The rates do seem ambitious and
employers  may  be  justified  in  voicing  their  fears  about  the  adverse  effects  these  sort  of
minima would have on employment. In a recent study undertaken at the London School of
Economics, the authors argue that a national minimum wage set at £4.41 would affect 20
percent of the workforce and inevitably generate unemployment.7
Experience from abroad
In order to assess the impact of the national minimum wage on the British labour market,
situations in other countries on the continent provide useful comparisons. This is especially
true  in  the  context  of  the  single  European  market  which  in  the  long  run  might  make  a
European  minimum  wage  a  legal  requirement.  France  is  an  ideal  example  where  it  is
estimated that about 1.7 million (10.5 percent) workers are directly affected by the “salaire
minimum interprofessionel de croissance” (SMIC). This is pitched at about 71 percent of the
average  wage and  is  applicable  to  all  workers  aged 18 and above.  About  14  percent  of
working women  are directly  affected,  the figure  for  men  being 5 percent.  In  some cases
interestingly enough, agreements reached through collective bargaining set wages below the
national minimum wage. This means that incremental rises do not necessarily mean higher
wages  at  the  end  of  the  day  because  the  wage  floor  artificially  sets  wages  above  their
negotiated rate. It is difficult to estimate the consequences that wages set above their market
clearing level have on employment but one thing remains certain, namely that incidences of
poverty pay in France remain extremely marginal.
The SMIC has also long been accepted by employers and to a certain extent the general
public who were very virulent in their condemnation of a former Prime Minister's attempt to
tamper with it.  The outcry was such that  the project  of establishing a separate  SMIC for
young people was soon withdrawn. Ironically though, France does not have any minimum
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income even though the “Revenu Minimum d'Insertion” has tended increasingly to fulfil this
function.
Empirical evidence
Bearing in mind what is said above and given that official unemployment is decreasing in
Great Britain but moving in the opposite direction in France, it is worth wondering whether
many  workers  are  not  pricing  themselves  out  of  jobs.  To put  it  more  simply,  has  wage
deregulation contributed to the decline in unemployment in Great Britain? The Conservatives
would agree but probably more for ideological reasons than anything else. Empirical evidence
on the other hand would suggest that minimum wages, unless set ‘ludicrously’ high, do not
have adverse effects on employment. A survey undertaken by the TUC shows that “86 percent
of  personnel  officers  said  a  minimum wage of  £4.10 would  cause  no  job  losses  in  their
business” (Trade Union Council  1996).  However,  this  sort  of  postulate  may be based on
unrepresentative data insofar as the very fact that the sample firms had personnel officers
suggests a certain degree of organization and size which is exactly what the majority of low
paid workers lack. Industries that can afford to employ personnel officers more often than not
pay decent  wages.  The same mistake is reiterated further on in the report when a survey
carried out by the Institute of Chartered Accountants is quoted. According to the Institute, 51
percent of survey respondents claim that employment would not be cut if a national minimum
wage was set at £4.50. Needless to say however, that the sectors being referred to are not
particularly affected by low wages.
One way of verifying the empirical evidence is to examine the situation in the former Wages
Council industries three years after abolition. The following table shows just how rates in four
of the formerly protected sectors have been affected since 1993.
Given that 14.3 percent of employees in the sectors assessed are earning less than the 1993
Wages Council rate and 49.6 percent less than what would be the 1996 Wages Council rate, a
rise  in  employment  could  be  expected  in  these  sectors.  This  rise  should  be  particularly
important as far as part time employment is concerned since in both cases figures are higher
(15.3  percent  and  57.5  percent  respectively).  As  the  Low  Pay  Network  report  suggests,
although  it  is  not  possible  to  make  direct  causal  links  between  rises  or  falls  in  pay and
changes in employment because of numerous other factors which affect the labour market, it
is interesting to turn the disemployment hypothesis of minimum wages upside down and see
whether  the  abolition  of  minimum  wage  fixing  and  subsequent  wage  reduction  have
contributed to a rise in employment in the affected areas. The statistics used by the Network
show that employment growth was greater prior to abolition than post abolition! What stands
out even more clearly though is the number of full time jobs that have disappeared since
abolition  whereas  part  time  employment  has  increased  in  the  same  proportions  as  in
1992-1993 just before abolition. In more general terms, these figures corroborate evidence
that part time work is a direct consequence of wage deregulation and the drive towards greater
flexibility.
Table 15.3 Percentages of workers being paid a) below relevant Wages
Council rates in November 1993, April 1994, April/May 1995; b) below
the rate fixed prior to abolition (Relevant rates calculated using
inflation weighting)
Below
Old rate
Below
April/May
Below
April
Below
November
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1995 1994 1993
Hotel and catering
Full time 7.8 33.1 21.1
Part time 12.2 54.3 33.1
All 10.4 45.8 28.0 20.8
Shops
Full time 22.2 49.1 36.6
Part time 20.2 63.1 55.7
All 20.7 59.5 51.4 27.1
Clothing
Full time 16.0 30.1 29.8
Part time 3.8 15.4 17.2
All 14.3 28.0 28.4 13.9
Hairdressing
Full time 25.0 43.2 33.3
Part time 13.0 60.9 34.5
All 20.9 49.3 33.9 20.8
All jobs
Full time 12.5 36.7 26.3
Part time 15.3 57.5 42.2
All 14.3 49.6 36.5 22.3
Source: Adapted from Priced into Poverty: An Analysis of Pay Rates in Former Wages
Council Industries, Low Pay Network, 1995, p. 12.
One can only conclude that contrary to current thinking, the abolition of minimum wages
has not led to an increase in employment in the sectors concerned. Since these are the lowest
paying industries in the British economy, it can be assumed that a minimum wage pitched at
the former lowest Wage Council rate (£2.66/hour April 1993, button manufacturing) would
not have adverse effects on employment (see Whitton, 1995).
If we link this to the former question of whom the national minimum wage is supposed to
protect in the first place, then the answer is clear: those people on the labour market whose
wages, because of a variety of factors including inadequate worker organisation, high labour
turnover, poorly qualified workers and a saturated labour market to quote but a few, are less
than £2.66/hour. This includes a majority of part time workers  - most of whom are women
- who make up the lowest paid members of the British workforce. If this rate is updated, then
the figure of £3.20 quoted by Metcalf which would lift 10 percent of the workforce out of
poverty wages, seems realistic if perhaps slightly ambitious because of the disruptive effects it
could have on wage distribution when initially introduced (see The Guardian, 1996).
The impact of a minimum wage on wage distribution and poverty
As mentioned before, trade union hostility to minimum wages has traditionally been based on
their belief that collective bargaining is the only healthy way out of poverty wages. At the end
of the 1980s having sustained severe damage from the Thatcher  governments,  the unions
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gradually came round to the view that  poverty pay and decent levels of pay were no longer
within their grasp and that:9
An effective fair wage strategy must be based on the twin pillars of collective bargaining
and legislative support. Collective bargaining by itself will inevitably fail to reach many of
those  in  poorly  organised  sectors  where  low  pay  so  often  prevails  (Trade  Union
Council/Labour Party, 1986, p. 5).
Soon this call  for legislative support became an outright appeal for a national minimum
wage and a revision of their traditional stance:
The TUCs bargaining strategy and Labour's programme for tackling poverty will help us to
achieve just that. The centrepiece for this has to be the national minimum wage. Nothing can
remove the gross injustice of poverty pay (Trade Union Council, 1991, p. 390).
This view matured rapidly until the TUC openly acknowledged the weaknesses of worker
organisation in some sectors:
... we believe that free collective bargaining was never going to nor will it ever adequately
take care of the right of all people to earn a decent level of pay,... (Trade Union Council
1991, p. 392).
This is reminiscent of the shortcomings of the 1970s Social Contract which despite union
pledges largely failed to improve pay conditions for the worst off. One of the main reasons
behind this was the unions’ inability to exclude from negotiations the proportion of increase
that was specifically designed to improve pay for the poorest.
The  question  of  wage  differentials  is  of  course  paramount  in  establishing  a  national
minimum  wage  because  of  the  possible  disruptive  ‘knock-on’  affects.  It  is  thought  that
employees are keen to maintain differentials even if this entails a damaging increase in the
overall  wages bill.  What  actually  happens though is  that  wages tend to  cluster  round the
minimum:  those  earning  under  the  minimum  are  abruptly  awarded  a  rise  whereas  those
earning just above see their wages gradually absorbed into this minimum wage cluster. To
this end the lower end of the wages spectrum tends to be compressed in the long run and
according  to  some  researchers  this  phenomenon  can  contribute  to  an  increase  in
employment.10 This increase can be put down to several factors the main one being stability of
wages  within  the  given  sector  which  in  turn  reduces  wages  undercutting  and  enables
employers to compete on the basis of quality.  In addition to this, if the firm involved has
specific  skill  requirements,  then employers  will  have incentives  to reduce the quit  rate of
workers.11 This is perhaps wishful thinking when the type of employment most prone to low
wages is taken into consideration. Low paid workers are concentrated in low skill industries
where  training  is  more  often  than  not  hands-on  and  short.  Even  so,  the  reliability  of  a
workforce is surely an asset that cannot be overlooked.
Given  that  a  relatively  low national  minimum wage  would  protect  the  most  vulnerable
workers from poverty pay, the next issue to address is the effects it would have on household
poverty. The constant confusion of wage rates and wage income has tended to foster the myth
that a national minimum wage would make important inroads into household poverty insofar
as it would hoist low wage earners into a higher wage bracket and out of poverty. This would
be true if a national minimum wage were set at such a rate as to increase wage income for
people working a 39 hour week up to or in excess of what they would be entitled to on
income support.
8
It is also commonly thought that households deemed to be poor derive their main income
from the earnings of a low paid worker. Contrary to popular belief, far more poverty can be
attributed to unemployment than to low wages despite the concentration of the low paid in the
lower  household  income  deciles.  Low  paid  workers  are  likely  to  come  from  poorer
households but using the national minimum wage to alleviate their poverty is once again a
misuse of legislation. For the minimum to have any impact on household poverty, it would
have to be pitched at a rate likely to exclude the workers it is supposed to protect from the
labour  market.  Loss  of  earnings  from  employment  condemns  workers  to  rely  solely  on
benefits  to  make  ends  meet.  On the  other  hand,  a  minimum wage  set  so  as  to  generate
passport earnings to benefits - if the interface between the two is exploited correctly - while
not threatening employment, appears to be the only reasonable way out, at least if only to give
the national minimum wage a chance of becoming a viable economic reality.
The extent to which wage earnings provide workers with a passport to social allowances is
not easy to determine especially in terms of household income since benefits depend largely
on  individual  family  circumstances.  There  seems  nevertheless  to  be  a  drive  to  set  the
minimum wage at a level that would enable wage earners working a 39 hour week to dispose
of  income  at  least  in  excess  of  income  support  which  in  itself  is  certainly  laudable  but
somewhat modifies the reason why a minimum wage should be established in the first place.
If  we  accept  that  the  minimum  wage  should  initially  be  designed  to  protect  the  most
vulnerable members of the workforce then increasing coverage to encompass family needs
means that the minimum wage rate encroaches upon wage income thus distorting the interface
between itself and benefits.
There is one major snag to this argument, namely Family Credit which was introduced in
1988 to replace Family Income Support. Since 1992, Family Credit is used to top-up wages
for employees working at least sixteen hours a week (see Barber and Whitton 1993). It might
be argued that it is possible to come to terms with this system, however unethical it may
seem, for the sake of getting a national minimum wage on the statute books in the belief that
the minimum could play a vital role in encouraging government to discard wage topping-up in
the near future by relating wages to earnings far more than to incomes. The current wage
supplementing system does ensure a certain degree of redistribution but in doing so distorts
even more the overlap between incomes and earnings.
Added to this is the simple fact that one single across-the-board national minimum wage is
simple and easily accessible and enforceable and thus would lend itself to a multitude of other
functions including that, if need be, of a benchmark for the calculation of a plethora of social
benefits. To avoid any contaminating overlap between the two, the national minimum wage
should fulfil one single function, that of protecting the most vulnerable. These are the terms
on which, in my opinion it has a chance of being implemented. Its future thereafter would be
a matter of examining its integration into the distribution of wages involving a revision of its
raison d'être.
Conclusion
Minimum wages essentially disrupt the bottom of the wage spectrum and if we believe that
rather  than  integrating  protective  legislation  labour  markets  should  accommodate  a  lower
margin of the most vulnerable poorly paid workers, then the national minimum wage is not on
the agenda. My own thoughts on the national minimum wage have somewhat mellowed over
the  last  few years  and I  no  longer  think  that  it  is  the  end to  all  evils  inherent  in  wage
distribution.
We should not  allow sentiment  to  prevent  us  from addressing the issue  of  the national
minimum wage in a realistic way. That is not to say that the national minimum wage cannot
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by itself instantly wipe out earnings related poverty. It can alleviate disadvantage to a certain
extent by being integrated into a benefit scheme whereby income becomes the determining
factor rather than wages. If the national minimum wage is burdened with too many virtues
then it  will sink under its own weight and will not even be given a chance to display its
potential to evolve and come up to greater expectations.
Notes
1. For further discussion on wage supplementing see Whitton, T. 1995, pp. 114-123.
2. As reported in The Guardian October 22, 1996.
3. This theory is rather knocked on the head when one considers the 1970 Equal Pay Act
whereby women's pay increased by about 10 per cent. There is little evidence to show
that this had considerable disemployment effects for women.
4. Even though one leading politician did suggest that unemployment was a price worth
paying for bringing down inflation and creating financial stability!
5. Although the 1996 TUC conference had initially endorsed this approach by calling for
‘more  than  £4’,,  and  £4.26 in  the  first  year  of  a  Labour  government,  at  least  two
prominent  trade  unionists,  Scargill  and  Bickerstaffe,  soon  broke  ranks  and  even
increased their initial targets.
6. Figures for bar and hotel work are low but additional cash due to tips must be taken into
consideration.
7. Fernie, S. and Metcalf, D. Low Pay and Minimum Wages: the British Evidence, London
School of Economics: London, September 1996 (forthcoming 1997).
8. In compiling their tables, the Low Pay Unit used figures from the Employment Gazette,
January and July 1995 and the Historical Supplement, October 1994.
9. They  have  possibly  been  encouraged  to  think  along  these  lines  by  the  European
Commission's desire to see member countries commit themselves to decent wage levels.
Even so, since the government has not signed the Social Charter, Britain is not in breach
of European law by not having any machinery to protect the lowest paid. Complaints to
the European courts  therefore  have only a  limited  impact  although they do help to
maintain the issue in a European context.
10. For a full analysis see Dickens, R., Machin, R. and Manning A. 1994.
11. This is often referred to as dynamic monopsony which very briefly means attracting
more  workers  by  reducing  wage  competition.  In  instances  where  workers  have  little
opportunity to  exploit  competition  between employers  in  order  to  sell  their  labour  to  the
highest bidder, essentially because qualifications and experience have little negotiating value
(for example a timber firm in a remote region in Canada) dynamic monopsony is plausible. If
this theory is applied to the low paying sectors of the British labour market there are some
similarities but the monopsonistic situation is completely distorted by fierce labour market
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competition due to excessively high unemployment.  In a perfect  monopsony workers can
accept  - or almost indulge in  - employment if they so desire whereas in the sectors we are
concerned with, employment is more often then not a precious commodity. Using ‘decent’
wages to maintain a reliable workforce is probably a far more credible argument but in the
absence  of  national  minimum wage legislation  depends  entirely  on  individual  employers'
management. 
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